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 The growth of the labour force has often been cited as an explanation of 
the sustained high rate of output growth in the Irish economy over the last 
decade. Prior to the current boom, there was a high level of 
unemployment, a low level of female labour force participation and a large 
pool of Irish workers resident abroad because of historical emigration 
patterns. These stylised facts of the pre-boom Irish labour market are 
frequently used to explain why output growth did not result in upward 
wage pressures strong enough to choke off the growth because of falling 
competitiveness, but rather in increased employment and sustained growth 
rates. 
1. 
Introduction
One of the main sources of labour force growth has been the 
increasing tendency for women who previously worked in the home to 
join the paid labour force. To a lesser extent, men who were unemployed 
but not actively seeking work because of disincentives due to the benefit 
system or discouragement because of poor labour market conditions 
began actively to participate, as evidenced by the fall in unemployment, 
and particularly long-term unemployment, in recent years. This paper aims 
to shed some light on the issue of the potential of the domestic labour 
force to expand further, and in particular, how the rate of expansion is 
likely to compare to past rates. 
Economists are most often interested in the responsiveness of labour 
force participation to changes in wage rates and the usual way to express 
this is in the form of an elasticity. This is defined as the percentage change 
in the participation rate resulting from a one per cent increase in the hourly 
wage rate. Calculating such an elasticity is the main focus of this paper.  
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A knowledge of labour supply elasticities is useful for several purposes. 
When combined with information about how education levels – and hence 
wage rates – in the population are changing, future participation patterns 
may be predicted. Elasticities are also required when predicting the effect 
of changes in the tax system on government revenue. This is because a cut 
in the tax rate, for example, will have the “second round” effect of 
increasing tax revenue to the extent that it brings new participants into the 
labour market, as well as the more obvious “first round” effect of cutting 
revenue.1
Participation patterns are, of course, interesting in their own right; the 
recent increase in female participation in Ireland is widely accepted as 
entailing enormous social change. But these patterns are also important for 
wider predictions of the performance of the economy; for example, since 
unemployment is the difference between participation and employment, 
elasticities are important in predicting future unemployment rates; these 
rates and the government expenditures associated with them are then used 
in medium-term forecasting exercises, such as the ESRI’s Medium-Term 
Review. 
The first step in calculating a participation elasticity that is useful in 
predicting participation patterns for the medium term is to obtain more 
recent estimates of the determinants of participation than have been 
available to date. Thus, data from the 1998 wave of the Living in Ireland 
Survey are analysed. This survey is carried out annually by the ESRI for 
Eurostat, and surveys a nationally representative sample of households on 
questions such as labour supply, income and household characteristics. It 
is described in greater detail in Barrett et al. (2000).  
In order to be able to comment on how the determinants of 
participation have changed over the period of the economic boom, 
estimates that may validly be compared are required, so data from 1994 are 
also analysed in order to achieve this. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes changing 
participation rates in Ireland over the last few decades as well as detailing 
some of the results that have been found in previous studies as to the 
effects of increasing wages and other variables on labour force 
participation. Section 3 introduces the data used and presents some 
preliminary analyses of the data. Econometric results are discussed in 
Section 4 and the labour supply elasticities these results imply are outlined. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 From Figure 1, a plot of participation rates2 for men and women aged 25 
to 64 in Ireland since 1971, the striking and familiar pattern of strongly 
rising female participation rates is clear. Explanations of this pattern have 
emphasised both falling fertility rates and increasing wage rates, the latter 
in turn being explained by increasing levels of education for Irish women. 
2. 
Trends in Irish 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Rates  
 2 
 
1 It should be noted, however, that the calculation of such a “net” wage elasticity requires a 
more sophisticated analysis than the one undertaken here. 
2 Participation rates here are measured on a PES (Principal Economic Status) basis, because 
of the availability of a continuous series, whereas the analysis in the remainder of the paper is 
conducted on the basis of ILO definitions of participation. 
Figure 1:  Participation Rates for Men and Women Aged 25-64, 1971-2000, Ireland 
 
Source: CSO. 
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Irish women’s participation rates have for many years been low by 
international standards. However, the recent increases have resulted in 
their participation rates approaching those of other OECD countries, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
It is useful to outline the results of previous analyses obtained for 
Ireland and other countries. It is widely, although not universally, accepted 
that women’s labour supply is more responsive to changes in wages than 
men’s. Because in most countries, the vast majority of men participate in 
the labour market, most research has been focused on analysing women’s 
participation behaviour, and particularly that of married women, since 
single, childless women tend to respond to labour market incentives in a 
similar way to men. There is also a large literature that focuses on hours of 
work, but that is not relevant to the present analysis. 
 
Figure 2: Participation Rates for Women Aged 15-64, Selected 
OECD Countries 
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International results show that married women increase their hours of 
work by between 1 per cent and 7 per cent in response to a 1 per cent 
increase in the wage rate, with most of that response arising because of 
increasing participation in the labour market rather than because of 
increasing hours by women already in the labour market. The more reliable 
estimates are regarded as being those at the lower end of the range, closer 
to an elasticity of 1 than 7. 
Work on female labour supply elasticities for Ireland began with Callan 
and Farrell (1991), who estimated that in 1987, Irish married women had a 
participation elasticity of 2.73, a figure that is high by international 
standards, compared to an employment elasticity of 0.23 for men. 
Subsequent work by Callan and Van Soest (1996), also using 1987 data, 
showed lower elasticities for women, of about 0.7. Analysis of more recent 
data from 1994 indicate participation elasticities of 0.9 for women and 0.3 
for men (Barrett et al., 2000). Using data from the same year, but a slightly 
different methodology, Callan and Doris (1999) found a participation 
elasticity for men of 0.42, and for women of 0.54, with married women 
having a higher elasticity than single women – 0.7 compared to 0.4. 
These results suggest that labour supply elasticities are reasonably 
stable over time for men, but fell substantially between 1987 and 1994 for 
women. There are several reasons why female elasticities might be 
expected to have been falling over the 1990s. One is a purely mechanical 
one, that as participation by women in the labour market increases, the 
denominator in the elasticity calculation increases, so that even if the 
percentage point increase in the participation rate resulting from a 1 per 
cent increase in wages remains constant, the participation elasticity will fall. 
But there are also good economic reasons why the elasticity may fall. As 
wage rates rise, those women with the least unfavourable non-wage 
characteristics will be the ones most likely to join the paid labour force. 
Thus for example, women with no young children are more likely to 
respond to the increasing wage rates than others. This means that the pool 
of potential new participants is increasingly characterised by their having 
very unfavourable characteristics and therefore larger and larger wage 
increases are required to induce them to join the labour force. It is 
important to note that not all of these characteristics may be modelled 
econometrically; personal preferences and attitudes to combining work 
and childcare are difficult to measure and so are not included in this data 
set, and cannot therefore be specifically accounted for. 
As regards the effect of children on participation rates, it has long been 
noted that the presence of children has a strong effect on women’s 
participation probabilities, whereas they have little if any effect on men’s. 
Results for Ireland based on 1994 data have shown that children of pre-
school age reduce a woman’s participation probability by about 23 per 
cent. Callan and Doris (1999) show that these effects are stronger for 
single women (34 per cent) than for married women (19 per cent), 
presumably because the absence of a partner reduces the availability of 
childcare. Children of primary school age also reduce the participation 
probability, but to a lesser extent – about 7 per cent – and children of 
secondary school age actually increase the probability of participation, a 
result that appears to arise because of the income effect of children – 
children cost money – outweighing the opportunity costs of working, 
whereby childcare costs fall as the school day becomes longer and 
mothers’ preferences for spending time with older children are less strong 
as children get older. 
 
 Men, on the other hand, are little affected by the ages of their children. 
Results have often shown (Barrett et al., 2000; Callan and Doris, 1999; 
Murphy and Walsh, 1996) that the absolute number of children affects the 
probability of participation, but the absence of any age differentiation 
indicates that this is more likely to be because the replacement rate of 
benefits is increased by the number of children than because of childcare 
implications. 
3. 
 Labour Supply 
Patterns in 
Ireland in the 
1990s
Before turning to a more formal analysis, it is useful to examine the 
participation patterns in the data, which come from the Living in Ireland 
Survey for the years 1994 and 1998, as mentioned above.3 The labour 
force states recorded in the data are broken down according to sex and 
education level in Table 1 below. 
Table 1:  Percentage Occupying Labour Force States by Education Level, Men and Women, 
1994 and 1998 
 Men Women 
Status Unqualified Qualified Unqualified Qualified 
 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 
Employee 52.2 51.4 78.4 84.9 20.5 28.8 55.8 63.1 
Apprentice 0 0 0.4 0.4 0 0 0.1 0.1 
Temporary 
Employment 
Scheme 
4.9 7.4 1.8 2.7 0.4 3.6 1.4 2.6 
State Training          
Scheme 
1.1 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.5 0 0.3 0.7 
Seeking First Job 2.7 2.2 1.2 0.5 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.3 
Unemployed 26.8 22.7 11.5 5.0 2.1 2.5 3.3 2.4 
Retired 11.6 14.5 3.3 3.0 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.3 
Home Duties 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.2 75.4 63.7 36.4 27.4 
Education 0.1 0.3 2.5 3.2 0 0 2.0 3.1 
No. Observations 740 366 1,786 1,149 763 358 1,803 1,211 
Notes: Qualified individuals have at least a second level qualification (Group Certificate or higher); unqualified individuals have none. 
Those unemployed may be participating or not participating, depending on whether they are actively seeking work. Percentages may 
not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
 
The table yields some interesting results. The rise in the employment 
rate of women, both with and without formal qualifications is very striking 
– from 55.8 per cent to 63.1 per cent for the former and from 20.5 per 
cent to 28.8 per cent for the latter category. The increase in the percentage 
employed is also substantial for qualified men, whereas there was a small, 
albeit insignificant, drop in the employment rate of unqualified men. For 
this group, the unemployment rate did drop, suggesting that the 
employment rate should be observed to rise, but there was a 
corresponding increase in the retirement rate; for qualified men, and 
indeed women, there was no such increase. The increase in the 
employment rate for more educated men occurred as the unemployment 
rate fell. There was also a small increase in the proportion in education. 
For women, the increases in the employment rate came at the expense 
of being engaged in home duties, rather than unemployment. This is a 
common feature of women’s reporting of their labour market status, so 
that they often make labour market transitions directly from “out of the 
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3 These data form a panel of observations, but the panel aspect of the data is not exploited 
here; rather the data are treated as coming from two cross sections.  
labour market” to employment, without ever being recorded as 
unemployed. For both low-education men and women, there was an 
increase in the proportion in Temporary Employment Schemes. 
Table 2 shows the participation rates of individuals in the sample by 
various personal characteristics. 
Both qualified and unqualified men increased their participation rates, 
and the table shows that this increase was concentrated in the under-55 
age group, as might be expected. 
Table 2: Rates ( per cent) by Various Characteristics, 1994 and 1998 
  1994 1998 
Men            All 84.7 88.0 
Unqualified 72.8 75.1 
Qualified 89.6 92.1 
Aged less than 55 89.2 93.3 
Aged 55 or more 57.4 58.0 
Women       All 51.2 62.7 
Unqualified 26.1 37.4 
Qualified 61.9 70.1 
Aged less than 40 35.0 49.7 
Aged 40 or more 64.6 73.9 
Youngest Child Aged 0-4 42.2 56.7 
Youngest Child Aged 5-12 37.1 57.6 
Note: See Notes to Table 1 above. 
 
For women, some of the results are a little more surprising. Both 
qualified and unqualified, older and younger women increased their 
participation rates substantially. However, women whose youngest child 
was of pre-school age had a higher participation rate than those whose 
youngest child was of primary school age in 1994. By 1998, the 
participation rates for these two groups had increased substantially, and 
had more or less equalised. This suggests that the increasing wage rates 
and tastes for labour market work among the younger cohort of women 
are increasingly sufficient to outweigh the strong negative effects of young 
children on participation probabilities. This may have interesting 
implications for the future pattern of participation in Ireland, resulting in, 
for example, an increase on the demand for paid childcare, as well as 
having wider social consequences. 
Of course, these are merely frequency tabulations and it is not possible 
to control for all relevant factors simultaneously using this approach. It is 
for this reason that we turn to regression analysis in the next section. 
 
 The present study has two main aims. One is to obtain some more 
recent results for labour supply elasticities in Ireland than 1994 and the 
second is to compare results over time; this requires that econometric 
model specifications be consistent between years, as otherwise, any 
differences in estimated parameters would be difficult to interpret. 
4. 
Analysis of 
Changing Labour 
Supply 
Responsiveness 
in the 1990s Women and men are analysed separately in order to allow for the generally perceived differences in women’s and men’s labour supply 
behaviour. This is standard practice. 
The decision to separate those with very low education levels (no 
second level qualifications) from others was less standard and therefore 
requires some explanation. In Callan and Doris (1999), it was established 
that, for men in particular, there was a marked difference in behaviour 
between individuals according to their educational qualifications. This may 
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be because the nature of non-participation is different for unqualified men 
than for those with some formal educational qualifications. Unqualified 
non-participants are significantly more likely to record themselves as being 
retired than more qualified men; 42 per cent of low education non-
participants reported themselves to be retired in 1994 (58 per cent in 1998) 
compared to 30 per cent (36 per cent in 1998) of better educated non-
participants. This may be because the difficulty that older, unqualified men 
face in retraining after a period of unemployment makes them more likely 
to leave the labour market. It may also be because low skill work tends to 
be more physical, and therefore more difficult to carry out as the 
individual ages. More qualified men are more likely to be in education than 
to retire – 23 per cent of non-participants in 1994 and 41 per cent in 1998 
– whereas practically none of the lesser educated non-participants were in 
education.4
Clearly, the motive for early retirement is different from the motive for 
continuing in or returning to education, and so if a participation equation 
were estimated over both lower and higher educated men, the results 
would fail to capture adequately the effect of wages on the probability of 
participation of lower educated men. Since the present study is concerned 
to establish the extent of male as well as female participation responses, a 
strategy of separating individuals into two groups on the basis of their 
educational levels, similar to that followed in Callan and Doris (1999) is 
followed here. 
Educational level is clearly a variable that is very strongly correlated 
with wages, and so the issue arises as to whether the sample separation, 
with its attendant sample size reduction, could be avoided by specifying a 
more flexible functional form for the wage effect. This was experimented 
with and proved unsuccessful, suggesting that the reason for different 
behaviour at different education levels is not the different wage rates 
accompanying the education levels, but rather unobservable characteristics 
of those who left school so early. 
For men and women, and for those with low education and higher 
levels of education, separate Probit models5 were used to analyse the 
participation decision. Participation is defined as either working or 
unemployed and actively seeking work, in accordance with the usual ILO 
definition. It should be noted that, for men, the actively seeking work test 
is the important one, since a large majority of men are either working or 
recorded as unemployed in administrative records; this means that unless 
participation is carefully defined, a discussion of the participation decision 
for men is uninteresting. 
The sample used is also limited to men and women aged over 22 years. 
This is designed to avoid having to model the decision to study for a third 
level qualification after leaving school. Farmers and the self-employed 
were excluded, because of the difficulty of calculating hourly wage rates. 
Farm labourers were also excluded because of the extremely low wages 
4 Note that these figures refer to men aged over 22 years. 
5 The Probit model is designed to take account of some technical problems that arise in the 
analysis of decisions that are of an “either/or” nature if Linear Regression techniques are 
used, such as the possibility of predicting participation probabilities that are negative or 
greater than one. It is the econometric model most commonly used in analysing labour force 
participation. 
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recorded for this group.6 Those recorded as ill or unemployed due to 
illness were further excluded. 
The wage variable used is the predicted log hourly gross wage rate. The 
wages were predicted according to the wage regressions included in the 
Appendix. Linear regression was used for men, whereas a Heckman 
model7 was used for women to control for the well-recognised problem of 
sample selection, with variables for the number and ages of children being 
used as the identifying variables in the participation equation. 
Although not directly relevant to the analysis of participation, it is 
interesting to note that the estimated returns to education fell for men but 
rose for women between the two years; the drops were significant for men 
whereas the rises for women were largely insignificant. A further 
interesting point is that the results suggest that the profile of unobservable 
characteristics for women who joined the labour force between 1994 and 
1998 changed substantially.8 Note that the 1994 wage estimates differ 
slightly from those found in some previous studies; this is partly because 
no variable for the unemployment rate is available for 1998, so it is also 
omitted for 1994 in order to achieve consistency in the two years, whereas 
such a variable has been used in previous analyses of 1994 data.  
It should be noted that the fact that no satisfactory measure of the 
state of the labour market, such as industry- or occupation-specific 
unemployment rates is available is a drawback for the analysis of 
participation decisions as well as for the prediction of wage rates. There 
was a dramatic fall in unemployment between 1994 and 1998, which is 
likely to have increased the participation rate as well as the employment 
rate. There are several reasons for this. First, it means that fewer 
individuals are likely not to be participating because of the “discouraged 
worker” effect, whereby unemployed individuals are discouraged from 
actively searching for work because of the low probability of success. 
Second, some individuals – particularly married women – tend to make 
transitions directly from non-participation to employment when suitable 
opportunities arise in the labour market, so an increasing number of 
opportunities pulls them into the labour market. 
Normally, this tightening of the labour market would be reflected in 
higher gross wage rate offers, which would, in turn, increase the 
probability of participation. However, in this period, Partnership 
Agreement terms restraining wage increases were still being adhered to to a 
large extent, so labour demand continued to grow. The resulting 
differences in labour market opportunities between the two years cannot 
be controlled for in the econometric analysis. 
A further limitation of the analysis is that predicted gross wages, rather 
than net wages, are used. This means that all calculated elasticities are with 
respect to changes in gross wage rates. Given that tax rates fell between 
1994 and 1998, elasticities may change due to changing net wages for a 
6 It is possible that the additional provision of room and board explains these low wages. 
7 The Heckman model is designed to solve the problem that the same unobservable 
characteristics, such as motivation and labour market orientation, that make it more likely that 
a woman will work may also make it more likely that she will earn higher wages. In this case, 
omitting women who are not working from the sample – as would be necessary if Linear 
Regression were used because of the absence of wage rates in the data for these women – 
would cause the estimates to be biased. This is known as the sample selection bias problem. 
8 This is suggested by the fact that lambda, the variable that indicates the degree of sample 
selection bias, is not statistically significant for the 1998 sample. 
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given gross wage rate, rather than because of changing behavioural 
patterns. This should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. Since 
net wages are endogenous to labour supply, varying according to the 
relevant tax bracket, which in turn varies with hours worked, and since the 
tax system is highly non-linear, including net wages would have greatly 
complicated the analysis. 
The coefficients from the Probit model are not immediately 
interpretable. Accordingly, for both men and women, marginal effects 
showing the effect on the participation probability of a one unit increase in 
a variable for the average individual are reported alongside the estimated 
coefficients. The exception to this is the case of the interpretation of the 
wage effects; here, elasticities rather than marginal effects are reported. 
Results for men are shown in Table 3. Turning first to the 
demographic variables, living in an urban area reduces the probability of 
participation for men with no second level qualifications, but not for more 
highly educated men. The size of this effect rose between 1994 and 1998, 
as did its statistical significance, although the change in size of effect was 
not significant. 
Each extra year of age up to the age of 55 reduces the probability of 
participation by about 2 points for unqualified men in both years, whereas 
for men with qualifications, the effect is not significantly different from 
zero in 1998, and reduces the probability of participation by less than half 
a point in 1994. The fact that this effect is greater for lesser educated men 
probably reflects the greater difficulty in changing careers in the event of 
unemployment for this group; education confers greater flexibility on the 
individual. Age has a larger effect for those above 55 years in both 
education categories, probably reflecting some early retirement decisions; 
each year reduces the probability of participation by about three points, 
and by six points for unqualified men in 1998. The greater effect of age for 
unqualified men may be because low skill jobs tend to be more physically 
demanding, making early retirement more likely for this group. 
Table 3: Results of Probit Models of Participation for Men, 1994 and 1998 
 Unqualified Men Qualified Men 
 1994 1998 1994 1998 
 Coeff.     
(t-Stat.) 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff.      
(t-Stat.) 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff.     
(t-Stat.) 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff.     
(t-Stat.) 
Marginal 
Effect 
4.476 1.21* 2.818 0.68* 1.501 0.21* 0.471 0.06* Predicted 
Log Wage (10.21)  (5.30)  (7.15)  (2.03)  
-0.092 -0.026 -0.062 -0.016 -0.030 -0.004 0.001 0.000 Spline: Age 
< 55 (7.73)  (4.03)  (3.81)  (0.12)  
-0.088 -0.025 -0.235 -0.061 -0.241 -0.031 -0.273 -0.032 Spline: Age 
> 55 (3.58)  (6.61)  (8.44)  (8.14)  
-0.195 -0.054 -0.642 -0.160 -0.011 -0.001 -0.136 -0.016 Dummy: 
Urban (1.56)  (3.29)  (0.12)  (1.09)  
-0.542 -0.132 0.022 0.006 0.244 0.032 0.446 0.057 Dummy: 
Married (3.09)  (0.10)  (1.80)  (2.36)  
Constant -1.549  -0.565  -0.364  0.445  
 (3.90)  (0.82)  (1.26)  (0.98)  
N 685 345 1,658 1,031 
Participation 
Rate (%) 72.8 75.1 89.6 92.1 
* denotes elasticity rather than marginal effect. 
 
Being married increases the probability of participation for qualified 
men, a common result that is usually interpreted as reflecting stable 
personal characteristics. In 1994, marriage reduced the participation 
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probability for unqualified men. This is probably a replacement ratio 
effect, since men with dependent wives are entitled to an allowance in their 
benefit payments, increasing the proportion of potential earnings replaced 
by benefits and hence the reservation wage. This affects lower educated 
men both because they themselves are likely to have lower market wages 
and because they are more likely to be married to women with low 
attachment to the labour market and who are, therefore, dependent on 
their husbands. However, this effect had disappeared by 1998, for reasons 
that are not clear. 
Finally, the elasticity of participation with respect to the gross wage rate 
is shown. For both higher and lower educated men, the wage elasticity has 
fallen between 1994 and 1998. The overall male elasticity has fallen from 
0.46 to 0.19. The fall is, as discussed in Section 2, expected given the 
increasing participation rate – the group of those not participating are 
increasingly likely to be the ones with the poorest labour market 
characteristics. 
Table 4 shows the corresponding results for women. The specification 
is, of course, different to that used for men. In particular, children strongly 
affect female participation decisions, whereas no consistent effects could 
be found for men. 
Not surprisingly, children of pre-school age have the greatest effect; 
each child aged less than four years reduces a woman’s probability of 
participation by about 20 points in 1994 and by about 17 points in 1998. 
This result is quite stable across qualified and unqualified women. Children 
of primary school age have a much smaller, but still strong negative effect 
on labour market participation. Each child aged between 5 and 12 years 
reduces the participation probability by about 6 points. Interestingly, for 
low education women, this effect grew to 10 points in 1998, although the 
difference between the coefficients in the two years is not statistically 
significant. 
Table 4: Results of Probit Models of Participation for Women, 1994 and 1998 
 Unqualified Women Qualified Women 
 1994 1998 1994 1998 
 Coeff.     
(t-Stat.) 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff.    
(t-Stat.) 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff.    
(t-Stat.) 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coeff.    
(t-Stat.) 
Marginal 
Effect 
1.904 1.94* 3.503 2.80* 2.036 0.74* 1.668 0.58* Predicted Log 
Wage (7.76)  (7.18)  (17.42)  (11.95)  
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 Spouse’s Net 
Income (1.90)  (0.76)  (5.31)  (2.60)  
-0.069 -0.021 -0.076 -0.029 -0.059 -0.021 -0.067 -0.021 Age 
(9.50)  (6.42)  (13.46)  (11.15)  
-0.653 -0.198 -0.463 -0.174 -0.592 -0.205 -0.526 -0.164 Number of 
Children 
Aged 0-4 (4.58)  (2.64)  (9.34)  (5.64)  
-0.196 -0.059 -0.280 -0.105 -0.217 -0.075 -0.181 -0.056 Number of 
Children 
Aged 5-12 (3.09)  (3.07)  (5.08)  (3.44)  
0.008 0.002 0.152 0.057 0.145 0.050 0.056 0.018 Number of 
Children 
Aged 13-18 (0.13)  (1.81)  (2.76)  (0.93)  
Constant 0.497  -1.275  0.033  0.605  
 (1.40)  (2.18)  (0.15)  (1.90)  
N 737 342 1,703 1,015 
Participation 
Rate (%) 26.1 37.4 61.9 70.1 
* denotes elasticity rather than marginal effect. 
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Older children increase the probability of participation for women in 
both educational categories, although this effect is not always significantly 
different from zero. The reason for this, as suggested in Section 2 above, is 
that as children get older, the urgency of spending time with children 
weakens as their school hours lengthen, and at the same time, those 
children become more expensive, increasing the income effect of those 
children that pushes women into the labour market. These effects, where 
significant, increase participation by about 5 percentage points. 
The age of a woman also has a significant negative effect on her 
participation probability, with each year of age reducing the probability by 
about two points, an effect that is stable in size across the two years and 
the two educational categories. 
The effect of spousal income is significant for all but low education 
women in 1998, but tiny, with marginal effects of less than one-tenth of a 
percentage point.9  
As regards the effect of wages on female participation, the results are 
not as predicted. While the wage elasticity did fall for women with formal 
qualifications, from 0.74 to 0.58, the wage elasticity for lesser educated 
women rose substantially between 1994 and 1998 from 1.9 to 2.8. There 
are several potential explanations for this increasing elasticity. 
First, falling tax rates may have particularly influenced the potential net 
wage rate of unqualified individuals; in this case, for a given gross wage 
rate, the incentive to participate would have increased. However, this 
explanation is not supported by the results for men – here, unqualified 
men’s wage elasticity dropped substantially over the period in question. 
Changes in the tax code apply equally to men as to women, so if this 
explanation were valid, we might expect to see this wage elasticity also 
increasing. Of course, it is possible that the unqualified male elasticity 
would have dropped even further over the period in the absence of tax 
changes, in which case the argument remains valid, but this cannot be 
tested without modelling changes in the tax system explicitly. 
Another possible explanation is that young women who would 
typically have stayed in the home in the past can no longer afford to do so, 
perhaps because of the high cost of housing, and particularly of entering 
the property market. This is an argument that is regularly heard in media 
discussions of the increasing female participation rate. If this were the case, 
however, the pattern of increasing wage elasticities might be expected to 
hold for qualified as well as unqualified women, and this is not the case.  
A third possible explanation is that there was a shift in taste for labour 
market work amongst this group. This is a more plausible explanation, as it 
may be that the behaviour of a reference group is important in forming 
preferences, so that staying on ‘home duties’ yields lower utility if many 
women in one’s reference group are being drawn into the labour market.  
Finally, the change in the rate of unemployment between the two years 
may be important in explaining the result. If it were the case that women 
did not work before the boom in part because of being constrained by the 
lack of suitable labour market opportunities for unqualified workers, then 
the new labour market conditions may be responsible for this apparent 
increase in responsiveness. It might be argued that this should apply 
equally to unqualified men, but there is a significant degree of sex 
9 Note that marriage is not included separately here, as its inclusion was found to yield 
unstable parameter estimates. 
segregation in the labour market and if “women’s jobs”, for example in the 
service sector, were increasing at a faster rate than “men’s jobs”, then this 
would not apply. Again, as noted above, the data are not available to test 
this hypothesis. 
Table 5 summarises the elasticity results found. Whilst the overall male 
elasticity dropped substantially, the female elasticity is stable. This stability 
masks the composition of changes in responsiveness to wages, however. 
Whilst the elasticity for women with some educational qualifications fell, as 
expected, that for women with no qualifications rose. The overall labour 
supply elasticity did fall between 1994 and 1998, from 0.64 to 0.49, but this 
was driven by falling male rather than falling female elasticities. 
Table 5: Summary of Estimated Elasticities of Participation with 
Respect to the Gross Hourly Wage 
 1994 1998 
Unqualified Men 1.21 0.68 
Qualified Men 0.21 0.06 
All Men 0.46 0.19 
Unqualified Women 1.94 2.80 
Qualified Women 0.74 0.58 
All Women 0.92 0.93 
All 0.64 0.49 
 
 The main finding of this paper is that the elasticity of labour supply in 
Ireland fell between 1998 and 1994, and that this was driven by a falling 
male elasticity. The female wage elasticity was stable, and this was because 
the fall in elasticity for women with some educational qualifications was 
offset by a substantial rise in the elasticity of women with a low level of 
education. 
5. 
Conclusions
Turning to the future, it is likely that the decline in the overall elasticity 
will continue. As to the female labour supply elasticity, the picture is not so 
clear. It is important to note that the unqualified group of women is 
declining as a proportion of the female potential workforce, and so their 
impact on the overall picture is also declining. It is difficult to say, 
however, whether the participation elasticity for unqualified women will 
remain at the high level estimated for 1998, without knowing exactly why 
it rose between 1994 and 1998. If labour market changes were responsible, 
then the softening of the labour market currently underway may reverse 
the increase. If changes in tastes and attitudes were responsible, on the 
other hand, then this may be a permanent component of labour market 
responsiveness for this group of women.  
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 APPENDIX: WAGE PREDICTION 
ESTIMATES 
Table A1:  Male Wage Regressions 
 1994 1998 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Group Certificate 0.201 5.27 0.130 2.38 
Inter./Junior Certificate 0.308 8.82 0.174 3.57 
Leaving Certificate 0.460 12.41 0.319 6.46 
Diploma 0.609 11.78 0.536 8.18 
Degree 0.950 16.81 0.817 11.82 
Higher Degree 1.078 16.89 0.894 10.74 
Years of Experience 0.022 3.69 0.013 1.87 
Years of Unemployment -0.026 -2.69 -0.040 -3.62 
(Years of Unemployment)2 0.001 4.78 0.001 4.03 
Age 0.057 5.83 0.043 3.37 
Age Squared -0.001 -8.79 -0.001 -4.18 
Married 0.174 6.20 0.161 3.99 
Constant 0.005 0.028 0.626 2.67 
Number of Observations 1,592 1,019 
R2 0.49 0.40 
Table A2: Female Wage Regressions 
 1994 1998 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Wage Equation:     
Group/Inter./Junior Certificate 0.134 2.846 0.126 2.28 
Leaving Certificate 0.375 8.36 0.451 8.18 
Diploma 0.568 9.25 0.664 9.04 
Degree/Higher Degree 1.117 21.01 1.127 17.18 
Years of Experience 0.062 11.81 0.045 6.35 
(Years of Experience)2 -0.110 -7.25 -0.066 -3.33 
Years Out of Lab. Mkt. -0.027 -4.72 -0.018 -2.51 
(Years Out of Lab. Mkt.)2 0.071 3.62 0.052 2.36 
Constant 0.773 12.161 1.060 12.02 
Participation Equation:     
Group/Inter./Junior Certificate 0.244 2.74 0.044 0.39 
Leaving Certificate 0.428 4.93 0.080 0.70 
Diploma 0.424 2.89 0.479 2.46 
Degree/Higher Degree 0.790 6.07 0.482 2.78 
Years of Experience 0.112 9.29 0.099 6.47 
(Years of Experience)2 -0.281 -7.73 -0.275 -5.91 
Years Out of Lab. Mkt. -0.136 -13.11 -0.126 -9.49 
(Years Out of Lab. Mkt.)2 0.226 6.93 0.182 4.55 
Youngest Child Aged 0-4 -0.603 -6.071 -0.633 -5.09 
Number Children Aged 5-12 -0.166 -4.45 -0.177 -3.97 
Lambda 0.104 2.62 -0.001 -0.01 
Constant 0.022 0.18 0.659 3.81 
Number of Observations 2,437 1,357 
Log Likelihood -1642.8 -1032.9 
 
